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This study advances the limited generalizability of previous studies that have focused on developed 
market multinational enterprises (DMNEs) and explores the link between institutional distance 
and ownership choice of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs). Such studies in the 
EMNE context have been rare, and we provide key theoretical explanations for EMNEs’ distinct 
FDI motives to act as important contingencies in the link between institutional distance and 
EMNEs’ ownership choices. Analyses of  longitudinal data of Chinese firms’ internationalization 
from 2001 to 2017 reveals that the higher the institutional distance, the lower the level of EMNE 
subsidiary ownership control with market-seeking motives; while the higher the institutional 
distance, the higher the level of EMNE subsidiary ownership control with knowledge-seeking 
motives.  
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Scholars of global strategy and international business (IB) have become increasingly interested in 
examining the impact of cross-national distance (Berry, Guillén and Zhou, 2010; Kostova et al., 
2020; Werner, 2002) and foreign subsidiary ownership choice (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; 
Ahammad et al., 2017; Ahammad et al., 2018; Baik et al., 2013; Bhaumik, Driffield and Pal, 2010; 
Delios and Beamish, 1999; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020; Powell and Lim, 2017). The majority of 
previous studies on this topic have examined developed market multinational enterprises (DMNEs) 
by positing that such enterprises tend to choose low levels of foreign subsidiary ownership as 
distance increases in order to reduce market uncertainty and unfamiliarity (cf. Brouthers and 
Hennart, 2007; Hernández and Nieto, 2015; Morschett, Schramm-Klein and Swoboda, 2010; 
Slangen and Hennart, 2007; Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell, 2005). This perspective has generated 
a paramount but neglected research question: Whether and to what extent could this mechanism 
be equally applied to the context of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) given 
that such firms are in the early stage of internationalization and thereby different from DMNEs? 
EMNE possess distinct types of foreign direct investment (FDI) motives that are different from 
DMNEs (Ahammad et al., 2017; Arslan, Tarba and Larimo, 2015; Brouthers and Nakos, 2004; 
Dunning, 1993; Erramilli and D'Souza, 1993), such as, for example, EMNEs expand in foreign 
markets to overcome institutional constraints in their home markets (cf. Child and Marinova, 2014; 
Gaur and Kumar, 2010; Stoian and Mohr, 2016; Wang et al., 2012). These specific FDI motives 
make EMNEs react to the same institutional distance by adopting different strategies, which in 
turn is reflected in their subsidiary ownership choice (cf. Reinda et al., 2019)—a topic that has 
unfortunately received inadequate research effort (e.g., Ahammad et al., 2018; Dikova, Panibratov 




This study is designed to address this important question by examining the role of EMNEs’ 
FDI motives in the effect of institutional distance on subsidiary ownership choice. As such, we 
aim to answer it that is critical in EMNEs’ internationalization activities: How do FDI motives of 
EMNEs change the relationship between institutional distance and degree of foreign subsidiary 
ownership as opposed to what has been predicted based on DMNEs in regards to selecting 
subsidiary ownership? Our question is motivated not only by limited studies in the previous 
literature, but more essentially by its profound importance for advancing the existing literature in 
at least two major aspects. On the one hand, given that prior studies on institutional distance and 
foreign market expansions have been predominately concentrated on DMNEs (cf. Ahammad et al., 
2017; Dikova, Arslan and Larimo, 2017; Hernández and Nieto, 2015; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 
2020), the reality is that EMNEs are at a different stage of internationalization and characterized 
by more aggressive and springboard behaviors. In addition, the fact that EMNEs receive strong 
institutional support from their home markets (Bonaglia, Goldstein and Mathews, 2007; Luo and 
Tung, 2007, 2018) implies that previous studies on DMNEs cannot be easily generalizable in the 
case of EMNEs. EMNEs are also very different compared to DMNEs in the way that, for example, 
for EMNEs, institutional distance not only generates various costs that could be linked to 
institutional differences such as costs related to unfamiliarity hazards and relational hazards (Gaur 
and Lu, 2007), but they also create the opportunity of institutional arbitrage (Wu and Park, 2019). 
This choice of appropriate ownership status helps EMNEs to either mitigate such costs or take 
advantage of potential institutional arbitrage or both. On the other hand, although previous studies 
have considered the impact of MNEs’ FDI motives on subsidiary ownership control (Ahammad et 
al., 2017; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Wang and Larimo, 2020), 




influence subsidiary ownership choice, as well as their direct effect on subsidiary ownership 
control (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Li et al., 2018; Powell and Lim, 2017). The empirical findings 
of previous studies have been mixed at best (Ahammad et al., 2018; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020; 
Zhao, Luo and Suh, 2004) and have also been complicated by different stages of EMNE 
internationalization, which naturally have distinct FDI motives from those of DMNEs. Such 
double motivations of theoretical intension make investigating the role of FDI in the link between 
institutional distance and EMNEs’ ownership choice particularly important and timely.  
In investigating the relationship, we take as our starting point FDI motives and ownership 
control between institutional distance for two reasons. First, although extant studies have 
suggested various dimensions of distance, the most attention has been paid to examining cultural 
distance and firm-level phenomena, including ownership choice (e.g., Ambos and Håkanson, 2014; 
Berry et al., 2010; Beugelsdijk et al., 2018; Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst and Lange, 2015; Powell 
and Lim, 2017; Shenkar, 2001; Shenkar et al., 2020). Institutional distance is more particular for 
EMNEs, as extant research has suggested that escaping from poor home institutional environments 
is not the only motive behind Chinese firms’ outward investment (Liu, Buck and Shu, 2005), which 
suggests that other motives such as knowledge and marketing seeking, as Child and Rodrigues 
(2005, p. 401) indicate, “institutional constraints such as legal uncertainties, obstruction of 
domestic acquisitions, and regional protectionism through license restrictions do remain a problem, 
but it seems that successful firms have found ways to accommodate or circumvent them.” Second, 
in EMNEs’ overseas expansion, institutional distance not only contributes more to uncertainty and 
cost, but it also provides the opportunity not applicable to other types of distance; that is, 
institutional arbitrage as EMNEs are rapidly expanding into foreign markets is due to a variety of 




(Child and Marinova, 2014; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Stoian and Mohr, 2016; Wang et al., 
2012). Hence, institutional distance has a profound impact on EMNEs’ internationalization and 
ownership status (cf. Delios and Henisz, 2000; Powell and Lim, 2017).  
In this study, we focus on two types of FDI motives—market-seeking motives vs. 
knowledge-seeking motives—that are highly relevant for EMNEs as they are expanding into both 
developed and developing markets, which is clearly illustrated by the case of Chinese investment 
in Africa and other developed economies. One the one hand, market-seeking FDI motives arise 
when EMNEs seek to either sustain or protect existing markets in which they exploit advantages 
and capabilities. On the other hand,  knowledge-seeking FDI motives arise when EMNEs seek to 
access various types of knowledge to explore and develop a new set of capabilities (Chung and 
Alcacer, 2002; He, Khan and Shenkar, 2018). Moreover, it is exactly these two types of FDIs 
motives that make EMNEs distinct from DMNEs. For example, EMNEs’  early rather than mature 
stage of internationalization gives them some advantages (e.g., high efficiency and low cost 
supplied by having a large cheap labor force) that encourage expanding sales to foreign markets 
where they can compete with local rivals. However, most EMNEs still lack cutting-edge 
knowledge and are motivated to expand to developed markets to acquire and develop highly 
advanced technologies (cf. Bonaglia et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2014; Kedia, 
Gaffney and Clampit, 2012). We thus investigate how these two types of FDI motives affect the 
link between institutional distance and EMNEs’ ownership status, which is one of the important 
decisions in MNEs’ international expansion (Hennart and Slangen, 2015; Zhao et al., 2004; 
Madhok and Keyhani, 2012; Rienda et al., 2019), and, equally importantly, they provide empirical 
purity due to its close association with institutional distance and FDI motives, because, for example, 




subsidiary than low levels of subsidiary equity ownership, which is more convenient for 
knowledge-seeking FDI, but less so for market-seeking FDI across borders.  
We conduct our empirical analyses of these relationships on longitudinal data of Chinese 
MNEs for two reasons. First, Chinese MNEs have been described as having distinct FDI motives, 
and in particular, the abovementioned two motives have been mentioned frequently in extant 
studies (He et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2016). Second, Chinese MNEs have been very proactive in 
expanding into various foreign markets that are either institutionally distant, such as investment in 
developed markets (e.g., He et al. 2018), or proximate to the home country (Piperopoulos, Wu and 
Wang, 2018). The findings of the current study provide unique insights that shed light on the 
critical issue of whether existing understanding of the underlying effect of institutional distance 
on subsidiary ownership control based on DMNEs’ patterns applies to the special case of EMNEs 
(Ahammad et al., 2017; Dikova et al., 2017; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020). Overall, we contribute 
to extant studies (e.g., Berry et al., 2010; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020; Shaver, 2013) by linking 
institutional distance with subsidiary control in which knowledge-seeking motives of EMNEs are 
not amenable to higher institutional distance.   
 
1.1 Subsidiary Ownership and Cross-national Distance 
1.1.1 Institutional distance and MNE subsidiary ownership  
How does institutional distance affect EMNEs’ ownership status of subsidiaries? To answer this 
question, we draw on insights from two relevant research streams. Althugh both of these streams 
have been developed from their own theoretical logics in the DMNE context, they provide rather 
opposite predictions. We incorporate the insights from each to pinpoint a twin effect of the same 




On the one hand, institution and global strategy scholars have argued that greater distance 
is associated with an increased difficulty in coordinating and cooperating with local partners. This 
difficulty could influence the choice of high-level ownership and especially full ownership of the 
subsidiary (cf. Powell and Lim, 2017). For instance, in examining the ownership structure of 
Japanese MNEs in 36 countries from 1969 to 1991, Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) found that 
MNEs prefer total control to be partial or shared  (as with a joint venture) when the cultural distance 
is significant. Similarly, in an 11-year sample of 1,389 acquisitions in India and China and 
acquirers from 33 nations, Contractor and colleagues (2014) found that the likelihood of minority 
acquisition (rather than the majority or full ownership) was higher when the acquisition involved 
low institutional distance. Similarly, the study by Reinda et al. (2019) suggested that Indian firms 
prefer acquisitions when the distance between the home and host country is low. Followers of the 
Uppsala School have argued that firms should reduce their ownership levels to minimize risk when 
the distance between host and home countries increases, especially in the early stages of 
internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975).  
Other scholars have tried to reconcile these conflicting results by investigating various 
moderators of the relationship between cross-national distance and foreign subsidiary ownership. 
For example, in a meta-analysis, Zhao et al. (2004) showed that the relationship between cultural 
distance and entry-mode choice is significantly moderated by location, country of origin, and 
industry type. Similarly, Tihanyi et al. (2005) found that the home country moderates the cultural 
distance-entry mode relationship. These findings are the least relevant in the case of EMNEs, as 
they do not take into account unique challenges and opportunities for EMNEs facing large 
institutional distance and limited internationalization experience. Specifically, we argue that a high 




but it also offers an opportunity for institutional arbitrage. On the one hand, a large institutional 
distance, which is defined as the contextual differences between countries (Kostova et al., 2020, 
p. 467), and managing the distance has been indicated to be vital in performing cross-border 
business activities (Zaheer, Schomaker and Nachum, 2012, p. 19). Such differences inescapably 
involves high costs such as institutional misalignment, coordination costs, and ideological 
conflicts. A large institutional distance is especially challenging for EMNEs that are expanding 
from less-developed markets with weak institutional environments to developed markets with 
efficient institutional environments and less government intervention. Such institutional 
differences pose greater challenges for EMNEs due to their latecomer status and unfamiliarity with 
the institutional environments of developed markets.  
On the other hand, compared to DMNEs, many EMNEs are still in the early stages of 
internationalization and aggressively expanding into foreign markets to not only exploit their home 
based experience, but to also  take advantage of strong and stable institutional environments in 
host markets (cf. Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018; James, Sawant, and Bendickson, 2020; Meyer and 
Thaijongrak, 2013). A large institutional distance provides these EMNEs with an opportunity of 
institutional arbitrage in two ways. First, they utilize the institutional advantages of a host market 
(e.g., effective protection of properties and intellectual properties) to develop and grow their 
business assets and technologies. Second, these companies also engage in institutional arbitrage 
by taking advantage of institutional differences between the host and home markets or between 
the host and host markets that are unavailable and unimaginable for their counterparts that do not 





We thus resolve the intellectual tension between two literature streams by synthesizing 
their insights with the peculiarity of EMNEs in terms of relatively early stages of 
internationalization and proactive overseas expansion. This is not only to exploit their home-based 
experience, but also to capitalize on institutional merits/differences of host markets (cf. Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2018; James et al., 2020; Meyer and Thaijongrak, 2013). In addition, a high level 
of uncertainty and costs associated with institutional distance offers the opportunity of institutional 
arbitrage for EMNEs. Such a double effect of institutional distance for EMNEs, though subtle, has 
profound theoretical implications not only for EMNE ownership choices in foreign markets, but 
also on the role of FDI motives in shaping the relationship between institutional distance and 
ownership status. We next develop the theoretical arguments and explain how different FDI 
motives relate to institutional differences.  
 
1.1.2 Institutional distance and FDI motives of EMNEs 
The EMNEs with marketing and production expertise for specialized niches, standardized 
production processes, managerial flexibility in an uncertain and institutionally immature 
environment, and unique networking capabilities (e.g., He et al., 2018; Madhok and Keyhani, 2012) 
are motivated to exploit these accumulated advantages in more new markets by expanding and 
investing abroad where they can earn more returns. This exploitation is well exemplified by many 
EMNEs (like Alibaba, Xiaomi) that have expanded to many less-developed markets such as 
Pakistan, India, as well as many African countries. On the other hand, other EMNEs are motived 
to expand to foreign markets to acquire new knowledge (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Kedia et al., 
2012), which is clearly exemplified by many high-tech EMNEs (e.g., Tiktok, Huawei) that have 




sophisticated technologies (e.g., high-speed computation with excellent accuracy). Regardless of 
the type of FDI motive, EMNEs, due to their relatively early stage of internationalization, usually 
lack the experience of operating abroad and thus expand to seek novel knowledge and capabilities 
in foreign markets that are otherwise unavailable in their home markets (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 
1992; Luo and Tung, 2007). Scholars have focused on understanding such firms’ outward 
investment motives and suggested that these firms have various motives for outward 
internationalization ranging from knowledge-seeking to escape from their poor home 
environments (cf. Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Gaur and Kumar, 2010; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; 
Stoian and Mohr, 2016). Firms are also embedded in multiple institutional contexts (Meyer, 
Mudambi and Narula, 2011) that imply distinct FDI motives entailing distinct strategic priorities 
and concerns depending on the underlying motives (Lu, Liu and Wang, 2011), which unavoidably 
interact with the institutional distance. That is, EMNEs’ distinct FDI motives will have a strong 
imprint on their choice of foreign subsidiary ownership level as a response to institutional distance 
when entering foreign markets to exploit home-accumulated advantages while managing 
opportunism and breach of contracts that can happen easily in joint ventures (JVs) type 
arrangements (Hennart, 1991). 
How do distinct FDI motives interact with institutional distance? Although scholars have 
recognized the important role of motivation in FDI decisions, including its impact on location 
choices (Zhou and Guillen, 2016), few have considered the possibility that different types of such 
motives may influence the effect of distance on the foreign subsidiary ownership level in an 
opposite way (cf. Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020; Rienda et al., 2019). There have been no studies 




develop theoretical arguments for the moderating role of FDI motives on the linkage between 
institutional distance and EMNE ownership status.  
 
2. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Moderating Role of the Market-seeking Motive on the Distance Effect of Subsidiary 
Ownership Control Decisions 
As institutional distance increases, EMNEs incur additional costs, such as unfamiliarity with host 
country institutional environments, as well as relational costs of establishing local connections and 
networks (cf. Gaur and Lu, 2007). MNEs must carefully choose ownership status because different 
types invovle various costs that could be linked to institutional differences, such as costs related 
to unfamiliarity hazards and relational hazards (Gaur and Lu, 2007). While a higher institutional 
distance creates more risk, market-seeking FDI helps reduce such costs due to its relatively low-
risk nature. Market-seeking FDI should be considered low risk because many EMNEs are 
expanding to new markets to exploit their accumulated advantages (e.g. standardized production 
with high efficiency) in a broader customer base and they compete with local rivals in host markets 
(Dikova et al., 2019) by solely relying on their home-accumulated advantages. In this way, 
EMNEs have less worries about losing such home-based advantages to local rivals unable to 
imitate these advantages unless they can access a large cheap labor force embedded in the former’s 
home market. Low-risk FDI greatly mitigates great uncertainty and costs associated with a large 
institutional distance, leading to low control of ownership. In addition, the marketing-seeking 
motive requires less experiential knowledge about the host markets, given that EMNEs must offer 
standard and low-cost products that require low control in greater institutional- distance markets. 




distance markets, and thus these firm may opt for low risk and low-resource commitment 
ownership control. These arguments are consistent with the extant literature that indicates greater 
risk exposure and uncertain demand conditions are conducive for firms to pursue low-control 
strategies (cf. Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kim and Hwang, 1992).  
Nevertheless, how does the market-seeking motive interact with institutional arbitrage 
provided by great institutional distance? Even though market-seeking FDI is low risk, it does not 
mean zero risk, especially for those EMNEs expanding to less-developed markets where weak 
institutional infrastructure and high institutional risk exist, as well as stricter restrictions with 
respect to transferring the profits out of their countries. In such cases, EMNEs can seek special 
treatment by the host government and strong protection of their businesses and properties by 
counting on institutional ties between the host and home countries—currently exemplified by 
Chinese MNEs’ investments in Pakistan that are well protected by local governments thanks to a 
strong long-term relationship between the two countries. Such institutional arbitrage greatly 
mitigates high costs and uncertainty associated with institutional distance.  
While some scholars may argue that great institutional distance generates a high risk of 
exchange rate for MNEs that transfer their profits back to their home markets (cf. Lin, Chen and 
Rau, 2010), this argument neglects that these EMNEs, according to local regulations and policies, 
must re-invest most of their profits in host markets, thus making these EMNEs with market-
seeking motives less likely to incur the risk of exchange-rate exposure associated with greater 
institutional distance. Thus, EMNEs with marketing seeking motives will seek a lower level of 
ownership control when the institutional distance is greater. This leads us to suggest that:  
H1: The higher the institutional distance, the lower the level of subsidiary ownership 





2.2 Moderating Role of the Knowledge-seeking Motive on the Distance Effect on Subsidiary 
Ownership Control Decisions 
A different situation arises when EMNEs’ with a knowledge-seeking FDI motive want to invest 
in a foreign market with large institutional distance. Many EMNEs invest in foreign countries with 
large institutional distances to acquire new knowledge and technologies that are otherwise 
unavailable at home (He et al., 2018; Kedia et al., 2012; Kotabe and Kothari, 2016; Luo and Tung, 
2007, 2018). In some cases, EMNEs that need advanced technologies and knowledge in their home 
operations will bear a high risk in terms of potential knowledge distortion and/or leakage along 
the way, compared to EMNEs transferring from a foreign market with a low institutional distance, 
as it is easier when there is greater familiarity with the source. It is difficult for an EMNE to transfer 
acquired knowledge without effective control over the process (Makino and Delios, 1996; 
Steensma et al., 2000). A high level of ownership over a foreign subsidiary helps an EMNE 
improve the efficiency of knowledge transfer within their global networks and avoid knowledge 
distortion, especially in transferring highly complex and tacit knowledge from a host country with 
a large institutional distance (Ambos and Ambos, 2009; Bresman, Birkinshaw and Nobel, 2010; 
Kostova, 1999).  
EMNEs primarily acquire strategic assets through acquisitions of firms originating in greater 
institutionally distant markets (Ahammad et al., 2018; Dikova et al., 2019; He et al., 2018; Li et 
al., 2018) in order to develop capabilities. High-ownership control gives access to knowledge 
assets that might not be readily available through low-commitment entry mode options. As such, 
EMNEs prefer high commitment by acquiring firms from high-institutional distance markets (e.g., 
He et al., 2018; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013; Rienda et al., 2019). Similarly, Gaur and Lu (2007) 




higher institutional distance utilize a high level of ownership control that offers the firm greater 
control over foreign operations. This line of reasoning suggests that greater institutional distance 
leads to uncertainty and unfamiliarity for firms expanding into foreign markets and therefore incurs 
higher transaction costs and requires entry modes to consign resource commitments (Kim and 
Gray, 2008, Tihanyi et al., 2005; Zaheer et al., 2012) to benefit from local know-how and gain 
important foreign market knowledge. For example, Xie and Li’s (2017) study of Chinese 
internationalizing firms between 1987 and 2008 suggested that such firms are less likely to acquire 
a high equity stake in markets with a lower institutional distance in terms of economic development 
that pose significant risk to firms’ operations. EMNEs expanding to other developing and 
emerging economies encounter fragile institutions compared to developed markets and, as such, 
commit fewer resources. Therefore, EMNEs expanding to developed markets to acquire new 
technologies can utilize institutional advantages of the host market (e.g., effective protection of 
intellectual properties) to develop their core technologies and competence that enable them to 
effectively compete with their developed market counterparts.  
With knowledge-seeking motives, EMNEs expanding into foreign markets with a large 
institutional distance prefer high levels of equity ownership that allow them to effectively manage 
knowledge acquisition and transfer across borders (Dikova et al., 2019; Estrin, Baghdasaryan and 
Meyer, 2009; He et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2019; Kostova, 1999; Li et al., 2018; Zaheer et al., 2012). 
Such arguments are in line with extant literature that has suggested high- control mode is preferred 
when a firm wants to quickly learn from foreign sources of knowledge (cf. Zahra, Ireland and Hitt, 
2000). Based on the preceding discussion, we hypothesize:  
 
H2: The higher the institutional distance, the higher the level of subsidiary ownership 





3. Data and Analysis 
3.1 Data 
The study sample includes Chinese manufacturing MNEs listed on local stock markets from 2001 
to 2017. Chinese MNEs grew rapidly in local and international markets during this period. We 
identified the EMNEs based on information available from the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges 
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Because our analysis is at the foreign subsidiary 
level, we relied on annual reports to collect information on the EMNEs’ foreign subsidiaries, the 
degree of subsidiary ownership, and the location of foreign subsidiaries. Following guidelines 
from previous studies (e.g., Beamish and Inkpen, 1998), we dropped agencies or sales operations 
without substantive local operations. The sample is also limited to subsidiaries less than ten years 
old in order to remain consistent with the early stage of internationalization, given that most firms 
originating from emerging markets are latecomers on the global stage (e.g., Kedia et al., 2012). 
 To identify FDI motives for these foreign subsidiaries, we analyzed content of the selected 
MNEs’ annual reports. To maintain consistency with our theoretical interest, we limited our 
analyses to two specific FDI motives as identified by prior studies to be highly relevant for EMNEs 
and have provoked theoretical debate (Piperopoulos et al., 2018; Wu and Park, 2019). We 
subtracted the sample firms’ performance and R&D investments from their FDI activities as listed 
in the Company Financial Dataset provided by the China Stock Market and Accounting Research  
Co Ltd. We extracted distance data from the database developed by Berry et al. (2010). After 
removing the cases with substantial missing information for the key variables, the final sample 
contained 9,305 subsidiary-year observations of 570 Chinese MNEs from 2001 to 2017.  
3.2 Measures 




Consistent with our hypotheses, we measured the dependent variable as the ownership-holding 
ratio in foreign subsidiaries (Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2003; Shaver, 1998) by reviewing 
each EMNE’s annual report to collect the annual status of its equity ownership for each foreign 
subsidiary throughout the study period. To verify the data reliability, we compared the averaged 
value of equity control of Chinese subsidiary equity ownership with prior studies (e.g., Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012) and found consistent results in terms of EMNEs tending to exercise a high value 
of equity control over their overseas subsidiaries. These results could be due to a lack of advanced 
experience and skills that not only make managers incapable of protecting their resources and 
knowledge, but may also make them feel inferior when relying on external market institutions for 
protection. 
3.2.2 Independent and moderating variables 
Among the multiple sources of measuring institutional distance, we identified measures developed 
by Berry and colleagues (2010), as they calculated cross-national distance using the Mahalanobis 
method rather than the traditional Euclidean method. Although both measures satisfy five desirable 
aspects—symmetry, nonnegativity, identification, definiteness, and triangulation inequality—the 
Euclidean-based measure suffers from three shortages compared with the Mahalanobis-based 
measure. The first problem is that the Euclidean-based method ignores the correlation between the 
variable indicators used for computing, resulting in assigning more importance or weight to the 
characteristic measured by the correlated variables. The second problem is that this method 
neglects the variance of the variables. The third problem is that it is sensitive to the scale of 
measurement (Berry et al., 2010). The Mahalanobis-based measure does not have these problems. 
As such, we adopted the Mahalanobis-based measure of institutional distance. Specifically, the 






𝑊−1(𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦1 − 𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2), where W
-1 is the inverse of the pooled 
covariance matrix, and C is a column vector representing the components of the distance 
dimension. 
We measured institutional distance by the Mahalanobis-based measure of cross-national 
governance distance, referring to the differences in political stability, democracy, and policy-
making uncertainty ( Henisz, 2000; Henisz and Williamson, 1999; Whitley, 1992). This variable 
has two aspects of administrative distance and political distance and consists of five indicators: 
political stability, democracy scores, size of the state sector relative to that of the total economy, 
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, and regional trade agreement (Berry et al., 2010).1 
The internal consistency of this variable is relatively high (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.94), bolstering 
our confidence in this measure of governance distance. 
We relied on information from the sample firms’ annual reports to determine their primary 
internationalization motives. For example, Hangzhou Hundsun Electronics Co., Ltd. explicitly 
states the primary goals of its subsidiary in Japan as software research and development and new 
product design, among others. On the other hand, Shenzhen Jiawei Photovoltaic Lighting reports 
the primary motive of its subsidiary in Canada is to promote sales and increase market share. 
Specifically, we first subtracted the detailed information on all of the sample Chinese MNE 
subsidiaries. We then identified the main purpose of each subsidiary based on the detailed 
description. If a subsidiary indicates accessing advanced technologies in a host market is the key 
FDI motive, we coded it a knowledge-seeking motive; if a subsidiary indicates that increasing 
sales in new foreign markets is the key FDI motive, we coded it a market-seeking motive. 
                                                          





Accordingly, we categorized Chinese MNEs’ FDIs into two types: (a) to increase sales in new 
markets (market-seeking); and (b) to seek knowledge or conduct R&D (knowledge-seeking). We 
thus created two dummy variables: market-seeking motive and knowledge-seeking motive. When 
a company stated multiple FDI motives, we used the most frequently mentioned motive as the 
primary one.2 
3.2.3 Control variables 
We also included several control variables that could affect EMNEs’ ownership decisions. 
Regarding the parent-firm effect, we controlled for the parent-firm size (measured by the logarithm 
of its annual sales in Chinese yuan), age (years in operation), performance (return on assets), and 
R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided by total sales) (Wu and Park, 2019). Second, we 
included the level of state ownership (shares owned by the Chinese government) and the initial 
ownership level, which we measured by the MNCs’ level of ownership at the time of  initial entry 
into the foreign market (set to 1 if the EMNE had full ownership) (Chen and Hennart, 2002). We 
extracted ownership data from the equity change database of publicly listed companies in China 
and gathered other information from the firms’ annual reports (Piperopoulos et al., 2018). Third, 
we controlled for subsidiary age—the years elapsed since the firm’s establishment. Moreover, we 
controlled for the subsidiary size, which is operationalized by the real capital of the subsidiary 
invested in a foreign market. This variable takes the logarithm transformation. In addition, we 
generated variable, efficiency-seeking motives if an EMNE indicates that a specific FDI is 
                                                          
2 When coding FDI motivations, we paid particular attention to the possibility of Chinese MNEs having multiple 
motivations and carefully checked those cases. More than 94% of Chinese MNEs have an unambiguous FDI 
motivation. For the remaining Chinese MNEs with multiple motivations, marginal motivations are obviously less 




undertaken to improve efficiency, such as manufacturing with no professed sales function 
(efficiency-seeking).   
We also controlled for other types of cross-national distance including economic, 
demographic, cultural, and geographic distance that were all extracted from Berry et al. (2010).3 
National economic distance refers to differences in economic development and macroeconomic 
characteristics (Caves, 1996; Whitley, 1992). We measured economic distance based on a pair-
wise economic distance that consists of four components: GDP per capita (2000 US$), GDP 
deflator (% GDP), exports of goods and services (% GDP), and imports of goods and services (% 
GDP). We extracted national economic distance and other distances from Berry et al. (2010).  
In addition, prior researchers have suggested that a possible concern is related to the 
distance directions, as cross-national distance can be positive or negative depending on the host 
country (De Beule, Elia and Piscitello, 2014; Shenkar, 2012; Zaheer et al., 2012). To address this 
concern, we created a control variable, OECD, which was 1 if the foreign market belongs to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 0 otherwise. Moreover, 
we controlled for the financial crisis, which was coded 1 if the year is 2008 and 0 otherwise 
(Fainshmidt, Nair and Mallon, 2017). Finally, we included multiple dummy variables for industry 
(measured using China’s four-digit SIC coding system) and year of establishment (see Appendix 
A for variable description). 
3.2.4 Econometric modeling 
We used a two-stage Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) to correct for potential self-
selection bias. The first-stage analysis estimates the probability of an MNE’s entry into a foreign 
                                                          





market, and the second-stage analysis estimates the levels of subsidiary ownership incorporating 
the parameters estimated from the first- stage analyses.  
Firms purposely choose their entry strategies based on the nature of firm-specific character, 
capabilities, and industry conditions (Shaver, 1998). As such, in the first-stage analysis that 
estimates the probability of an MNE’s entry into a foreign market using the full sample (including 
firms that have and have not expanded overseas), we included the variables that potentially 
influence a Chinese MNE’s entry into a foreign market, such as the level of state ownership 
(because a high level of state ownership is more likely to be pushed by the “Go Global” policy), 
past performance proxied by return on asset (ROA) (because a Chinese MNE with a good 
performance would like more slack resources that enable it to expand overseas), the level of foreign 
ownership (because a high level of foreign ownership facilitates access foreign market), distance 
variable (because a high distance increases the difficulty of market entry), FDI motives (because 
a firm with motives for either foreign markets or knowledge is more likely to expand overseas), 
industry dummy (because different industries have different propensities for expanding overseas), 
and year dummy (take account of different temporal effects).4 After the first-stage regression, we 
generated an inverse Mills ratio λ, which was then inserted into the second-stage regression 
analyses. In the second stage, we estimated the level of subsidiary ownership control using the 
sample of EMNE subsidiary ownership (including Chinese firms that used high-ownership control 
mode and less-ownership control mode). The equation of the second stage is specified as: Sj  =
 β0 + β1 Xj +  β2 MS + β3KS + β4ID + β5MS × ID + β7 KS ×  ID + β9 λi + ϵj , where  𝑆𝑗  is the 
firm j’s subsidiary ownership, 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of control variables (including subsidiary information, 
local institutional variables, and parent-firm performance), and 𝜆𝑖 is an estimate from the first-
                                                          




stage model. The coefficient estimates of 𝛽9 indicate a firm’s probability of foreign expansion. 
Finally, 𝜖𝑗 is a random error term. We lagged the independent variables one year behind the 
dependent variable.  
 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for variables used in the analyses. 
As expected, firm age, firm size, past performance, and R&D intensity are all significantly 
correlated with subsidiary ownership. As significant correlations existed among some variables, 
we further investigated the potential multicollinearity by computing variance-inflation factors. The 
highest value was for firm age (4.21), and the average variance-inflation factor was 1.01, which 
are well below the accepted threshold of 5 and suggest that the data set does not have a serious 
multicollinearity problem. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents the independent effects of both market- and knowledge-seeking, as well 
as the interaction with institutional distance on Chinese MNC subsidiary ownership. After the 
baseline model of firm-level control variables and institutional distance (Model 1), Model 2 
presents the main effects of market-seeking FDI and knowledge-seeking FDI, and Models 3–5 
present their interactions with institutional distance.  
Of the control variables, firm size showed a significant and negative relationship with 
subsidiary ownership. This suggests that large Chinese MNEs tend to maintain relatively high 
levels of ownership over their foreign subsidiaries, while older MNEs may use a light approach in 
their foreign expansion probably due to their accumulated international experience. In addition, 




of ownership. Given that the results are consistent across the models, we used the full model 
(Model 5) to interpret the results of our hypotheses.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the higher the institutional distance, the lower the level of 
subsidiary ownership control by EMNEs with a market-seeking motive. The coefficient for the 
interaction term, MS * Institutional distance, was negative and significant (b = -0.224, p=0.035) 
with the confidence interval [-0.432, -0.015]. To better understand the interaction effect of between 
MS and institutional distance on levels of equity ownership, we plotted this relationship. As shown 
in Figure 1, the x-axis represents low and high levels of institutional distance; the y-axis represents 
levels of equity ownership by Chinese MNEs; the solid line represents the Chinese MNEs with a 
market-seeking motive; and the dotted line represents the Chinese MNEs without a market-seeking 
motive. In general, both lines have a negative slope, but the solid line is steeper than the dotted 
line with an increase in institutional distance, indicating that Chinese MNEs with market-seeking 
motives tend to adopt low levels of equity ownership with an increase in institutional distance. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the higher the institutional distance, the higher the level of 
subsidiary ownership control by EMNEs with a knowledge-seeking motive. The coefficient for 
the interaction term, KS * Institutional distance, was positive and significant (b = 0.781, p=0.000) 
with the confidence interval [0.423 1.140]. To better understand the interaction effect of between 
KS and institutional distance on levels of equity ownership, we plotted this relationship in Figure 
2 similar to Figure 1 (i.e., the x-axis representing low and high levels of institutional distance and 




representing EMNEs with the knowledge-seeking motive; and the dotted line representing Chinese 
MNEs without the knowledge-seeking motive). The solid line has a positive slope while the dotted 
line has a negative slope when the institutional distance increases, indicating that Chinese MNEs 
with a knowledge-seeking motive tend to adopt high levels of equity ownership with an increase 
in institutional distance. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is also supported.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
4.2 Robustness checks 
We performed several additional analyses for the robustness. First, we adopted an alternative 
measure of the dependent variable by constructing a new variable: WOS, which takes the value of 
1 if a Chinese MNE has 100% of foreign subsidiary equity ownership and 0 if the percentage of 
the foreign subsidiary equity is less than 100%. We then used this dichotomous variable as the 
dependent variable and re-ran the analyses. The results are reported in Table 3. As shown in Model 
5, the coefficient for the interaction term, MS * Institutional distance, was negative and significant 
(b = -0.070, p=0.000) with the confidence interval [-0.099, -0.040]. Also, the coefficient for the 
interaction term, KS * Institutional distance, was positive and significant (b = 0.069, p=0.005) 
with the confidence interval [0.021, 0.118]. These results are consistent with those using the 
continuous variable of levels of equity ownership.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 Second, we constructed another alternative measure of the dependent variable, majority-
owned, which takes the value of 1 if a Chinese MNE has more than 50% of foreign subsidiary 
equity ownership and 0 if the percentage is below 50%. We then used this alternative dependent 
variable to re-run the analyses and report the results in Table 4. Again, the results are consistent 




[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Third, we split the analyses into two parts: EMNEs expanding to more-developed markets 
vs. EMNEs’ expanding to less-developed markets. Following prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2019), 
we compared each host country’s real gross domestic product per capita (GDPP), which was 
extracted from the Penn World Table (PWT), with the corresponding value for China. Based on 
this comparison, we divided host countries into two groups—developed and emerging countries. 
We then re-ran the analyses for the two parts separately. We found that the split results provide 
further support for our hypotheses. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Fourth, prior studies have identified innovation distance as a key factor influencing MNEs’ 
knowledge transfer across borders, which is largely due to institutional configurations that foster 
the development of technology and innovation (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). We thus replaced 
institutional distance by adopting an alternative measure, national innovation distance, which is 
relevant for this study. We followed prior studies (Furman, Porter and Stern, 2002; Nelson and 
Rosenberg, 1993) to measure national innovation distance by extracting the number of patents and 
scientific articles per capita, from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), World 
Development Indicators (WDI), and Independent Schools Inspectorate (ISI) Governance, 
separately. We used national institutional distance to re-run the analyses. The results are reported 
in Table 6. As shown in Model 4, the coefficient of the interaction term, MS * Innovation distance, 
is negative and significant (b = -2.295, p=0.000) with the confidence interval [-3.388, -1.201], 
while the coefficient of the interaction term, KS * Institutional distance, is positive and significant 
(b = 4.411, p=0.001) as well as the confidence interval [1.822, 7.000]. These results are highly 




[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Fifth, one potential concern could be whether some sample firms did not declare their 
motives regarding internationalization, and if (or how) these firms could affect the robustness of 
the findings. To address this concern, we examined the detailed descriptions of the sample firms’ 
annual reports. This step allowed us to further identify such firms’ motives in a definitive way. In 
less than seven firm cases in which we could not identify motives, we took two steps to ensure that 
these firms would not affect our results. We included the firms in the analyses, classified them as 
neither belonging to market-seeking nor knowledge-seeking motives, and ran the analyses. We 
also excluded such cases from the analyses and re-ran the analyses. The results excluding these 
few cases are highly consistent with the results, including them. 
In addition, given the use of the variety of institutional distance indices to check if the results 
still hold using an alternative measure of institutional distance, we made great efforts to collect 
additional variables from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) about governance score 
from 1996–2019. WGI’s governance score is a composite variable consisting of six dimensions 
(i.e., voice and accountability, regulatory quality, political stability and absence of violence, rule 
of law, government effectiveness, and control of corruption). A higher score of this composite 
variable represents a higher level of governance and country or market institution market 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). We then used this variable to  construct an alternative 
measure of institutional distance by subtracting the value of each of six dimensions of a host 
country from that of China before taking the averaged value of the summation of their absolute 
values, which is specified: 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 =  
1
6
(|𝑉𝐴𝑖 − 𝑉𝐴𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| + |𝑅𝑄𝑖 −
𝑅𝑄𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| + |𝑃𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖 − 𝑃𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| + |𝑅𝐿𝑖 − 𝑅𝐿𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| + +|𝐺𝐸𝑖 − 𝐺𝐸𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| + |𝐶𝐶𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎|) , 




|𝑉𝐴𝑖 − 𝑉𝐴𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| represents the absolute value of difference between country i and China in terms 
of voice and accountability; |𝑅𝑄𝑖 − 𝑅𝑄𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| represents the absolute value of difference between 
country i and China in terms of regulatory quality; |𝑃𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖 − 𝑃𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| represents the absolute 
value of difference between country i and China; |𝑅𝐿𝑖 − 𝑅𝐿𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| represents the absolute value of 
difference for rule of law score between country i and China in terms of political stability and 
absence of violence; |𝐺𝐸𝑖 − 𝐺𝐸𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| represents the absolute value of difference between country 
i and China in terms of government effectiveness; and |𝐶𝐶𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎| represents the absolute 
value of difference between country i and China in terms of control of corruption. We then 
substituted the institutional stance with this variable, re-ran all the analyses, and report the results 
in Appendix B. As clearly shown (see Model 5), the coefficient of the interaction term, MS * 
Institutional distance, was negative and significant (b = -0.744, p=0.000) with the confidence 
interval [-0.984, -0.504]. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term, KS * Institutional distance, 
was positive and significant (b = 0.574, p=0.008) with the confidence interval [0.150, 0.998]. 
These results are highly consistent with the results reported in Table 2, indicating the robustness 
of the analyses.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
There has been increasing interest in examining institutional distance and subsidiary ownership 
choice (cf. Ahammad et al., 2017; Dikova et al., 2017; Powell and Lim, 2017; Rienda et al., 2019). 
Although studies have shown the significance of national distance in MNE internationalization 
strategies (Contractor et al., 2014; Dikova et al.,  2019; Eden and Miller, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; 
Moalla & Mayrhofer, 2020; Xu, Pan and Beamish, 2004), less attention has been paid to FDI 
motives, which are an important predictor of a firm’s international performance (Dunning and 




motives in the relationship between institutional distance and subsidiary ownership control, which 
has not been well examined in prior studies (e.g., Dikova et al., 2019; James et al., 2020; Moalla 
and Mayrhofer, 2020). We theoretically argued and empirically showed that different FDI 
motivations can amplify or buffer the influence of institutional distance on subsidiary ownership 
control, especially in the context of EMNEs. Specifically, a knowledge-seeking FDI motive 
negatively moderates the relationship between institutional distance and levels of subsidiary 
ownership, while a market-seeking FDI motive has an opposite moderating effect—that is, it 
positively moderates the relationship between institutional distance and levels of subsidiary 
ownership. These findings provide important insights to the current literature that has examined 
institutional distance and entry mode choice (cf. Dikova et al., 2017; Dikova et al., 2019; Moalla 
and Mayrhofer, 2020; Rienda et al., 2019).  
 
5.1 Theoretical Contributions and Implications  
First, this study contributes to the literature on the relationship between cross-national distance 
and subsidiary ownership. We identified FDI motivations as a boundary condition for the impact 
that cross-national distance has on subsidiary ownership control, which has been neglected in 
previous studies (Ahammad et al., 2017; Berry et al., 2010; Dikova et al., 2019; Powell and Lim, 
2017; Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Zhao et al., 2004). Our findings show that different FDI motivations 
play different roles. Knowledge-seeking FDI positively affects the relationship between 
institutional distance and degree of subsidiary ownership, while market-seeking FDI negatively 
affects the relationship between institutional distance and degree of subsidiary ownership. These 
findings enrich theoretical and managerial insights on EMNE internationalization strategy and 




Second, this study extends prior studies on cross-national distance and subsidiary 
ownership controls (Gaur and Lu, 2007; Xu and Shenkar, 2002) from a context of DMNEs to 
EMNEs with distinct FDI motives. Although a large body of scholarship has provided plenty of 
evidence on the role of national distance in cross-border international strategies and performance 
(Berry et al., 2010; Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Pajunen, 2008), relatively insufficient effort has been 
devoted to distinct FDI motives of EMNEs, which may shed important insight into the role of 
distance in ownership choices. The findings of this study suggest that as a host country’s 
institutional distance increases, EMNEs with a knowledge-seeking FDI motive opt for greater 
equity ownership over local subsidiaries, which is useful for knowledge transfer back to home and 
foreign operations in order to develop capabilities (He et al., 2018). On the other hand, as the host 
country’s institutional distance increases, EMNEs with a market-seeking FDI motive opt for lower 
equity ownership over local subsidiaries. Based on these findings, we caution against generalizing 
on  the relationship between national distance and subsidiary ownership control to EMNEs, 
because their FDI motivation could make them unique in regards to a large institutional distance. 
As a result, ENMEs could adopt ownership equity control that is different than what has been 
predicted based on DMNEs with regards to selecting the proper subsidiary ownership (e.g., 
Ahammad et al., 2017; Moalla and Mayrhofer, 2020). 
Third, this study further contributes to the literature related to EMNE firm-specific 
advantages (FSAs). Over the decades, international business scholars have debated whether 
EMNEs possess certain FSAs that facilitate their international activities (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; 
He et al., 2019; Ramamurit, 2012). This study addresses this debate by examining EMNCs’ FDI 
motives, institutional distance, and ownership decisions. We acknowledge that EMNEs face 




goals and strategies. As many EMNEs lack sufficient managerial capabilities for global operations, 
they tend to rely on a light-touch approach to integrating foreign operations with their home-
country operations (cf. Liu and Woywode, 2013), thus maintaining relatively weaker ownership 
over local operations (Cuervo-Cazurra, Newburry and Park, 2016). These firms also give greater 
autonomy to their foreign acquired firms, which supports learning and capabilities development 
efforts (e.g., He et al., 2018). However, such firms seem to reverse this approach when it comes 
to accessing or searching for advanced technologies or innovation capabilities. Our findings 
suggest that EMNEs’ ownership strategies are complex and rely on the specific nature of a firm’s 
challenges and goals. While this study provides new insights on EMNE subsidiary ownership and 
FSAs, researchers should also explore other potential contingencies; for example, the nature of 
EMNEs’ capabilities and other firm-level strategic issues, such as the orientation and scope of firm 
growth, to unlock this complex issue. 
Fourth, this study contributes to the internationalization literature (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977; Vahlne and Johanson, 2017). The positive moderating effect of a knowledge-seeking FDI 
motive on the relationship between institutional distance and ownership control suggests 
knowledge-seeking EMNEs commit more resources when institutional distance is high. The 
internationalization theory has suggested that during internationalization process, MNEs tend to 
make fewer commitments to a foreign market with a large institutional distance given the 
unfamiliarity arising from operating in foreign markets. These findings add to this literature by 
suggesting that while such a gradual internationalization process still holds for EMNEs with 
market-seeking motives, EMNEs with knowledge-seeking motives tend to embrace more 
commitments to a foreign market with large institutional distance. This study sheds light on the 




development and refinements. These findings are especially useful as scholars strive to expand the 
internationalization process to EMNEs with distinct FDI motives.  
5.2 Practical Implications 
Our results should alert practicing managers to the idea that successful global expansion hinges on 
the fit between specific FDI motives, institutional distance, and the appropriate level of subsidiary 
equity ownership. When establishing a subsidiary in a foreign market with a large institutional 
distance, EMNEs face challenges of effective operations, communications, integrations, and 
coordination across borders—all of which result in high transaction costs. An appropriate degree 
of ownership helps EMNEs achieve their intended goals, minimize transaction costs, and ensure 
the long-term growth of foreign operations. Successful internationalization begins with a careful 
assessment of the nature and extent of the cross-national distance, the specific motivations for 
foreign investments, and the appropriate selection of subsidiary equity ownership. For example, 
the fact that a negative effect of institutional distance appears to be stronger in market-seeking 
FDIs suggests that if an EMNE’s primary goal is international market growth, it must empower 
and localize foreign operations as much as possible with a lower level of subsidiary ownership. 
On the other hand, if an EMNE pursues a knowledge-seeking goal in a country with a large 
institutional distance, it needs to maximize control over foreign operations to manage efficient 
knowledge acquisition and transfer. In sum, it is critical and important that managers are aware of 
these motivation-specific implications of subsidiary equity ownership and ensure that a host 
country’s institutional distance from the home country is taken into account.  
5.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
This study paves a way for future studies in several directions. First, this study represents one of 




doing so, this study considers two important types of FDI motivations (i.e., market-seeking and 
knowledge-seeking). However, it should be recognized that EMNEs’ have other FDI motivations 
than the two we examine (e.g., efficiency-seeking, resource-seeking, and escape motives). 
Although the central interest of this study is in showing the opposite roles of market-seeking vs. 
knowledge-seeking FDI motives in the effect of institutional distance on the levels of subsidiary 
ownership, it would be a worthwhile and potentially promising avenue for future studies to look 
more broadly at other types of FDI motives and delve deeper into their interactions. Second, in 
this study, we utilized large-scale panel data on EMNEs’ internationalization activities including 
their FDI motives, institutional distance, and subsidiary ownership to test our hypotheses, and we 
performed a range of robustness checks with rigorous and consistent results. However, it remains 
important to be cautious in generalizing the findings to other emerging market contexts. Although 
China represents the biggest emerging market, such markets are highly idiosyncratic. The field 
would benefit greatly if future studies extend, replicate, and compare issues examined in this study 
across a broader set of emerging markets. Cross-emerging market studies could also reveal the role 
of country- or firm-specific strategic orientations in understanding EMNE subsidiary ownerships. 
Future studies could also  examine the timing of entry and ownership choice adopted by firms 
from different emerging markets. Lastly, future studies could integrate both formal and informal 
institutional distance and examine their role in EMNE subsidiary ownership choices as well as 
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix 
 Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Equity ownership 90.369 18.944 1.00                       
2 Firm age 10.601 4.602 0.139 1.00                
3 Firm size 21.648 1.980 -0.246 -0.001 1.00               
4 State ownership percent 0.136 0.214 -0.072 -0.075 0.257 1.00              
5 Past performance 0.698 0.557 -0.174 -0.161 0.616 0.042 1.00             
6 R&D intensity 0.022 0.354 0.033 -0.046 -0.179 -0.023 -0.191 1.00            
7 Subsidiary age 1.773 0.511 -0.029 0.518 0.154 0.047 -0.136 0.010 1.00           
8 Subsidiary size 4.567 3.139 0.022 0.010 0.00 0.103 -0.085 -0.019 0.072 1.00          
9 Demographic distance 0.156 0.157 0.001 -0.030 0.139 -0.019 0.090 -0.010 0.010 -0.131 1.00         
10 Culture distance 23.006 7.387 0.001 -0.021 -0.010 -0.092 0.066 -0.001 -0.010 -0.117 0.022 1.00        
11 Geographic distance 6.998 5.536 -0.038 -0.043 0.113 -0.051 0.081 0.020 -0.010 -0.187 0.409 -0.074 1.00       
12 Economic distance 0.265 0.223 0.018 -0.037 -0.030 -0.027 0.023 0.010 -0.048 -0.116 0.035 0.618 -0.291 1.00      
13 OECD 0.531 0.499 0.031 0.040 -0.032 0.037 -0.073 0.010 -0.010 0.062 0.099 -0.551 0.405 -0.629 1.00     
14 Correction for self-selection (λ) 0.007 0.028 -0.063 -0.050 0.081 0.034 0.109 -0.028 -0.063 0.130 -0.010 0.038 0.010 0.036 -0.073 1.00    
15 Institutional distance (ID) 2.269 0.330 -0.078 -0.076 0.060 0.041 0.086 -0.032 -0.010 0.150 -0.031 -0.066 -0.134 -0.145 -0.220 0.023 1.00   
16 Market-seeking (MS) 0.854 0.353 0.044 0.010 0.054 0.017 0.052 -0.085 0.001 -0.092 -0.096 0.058 -0.036 0.110 -0.131 -0.284 -0.026 1.00  
17 Knowledge-seeking (KS) 0.505 0.386 0.066 -0.010 -0.057 -0.022 -0.053 0.051 -0.043 -0.235 -0.057 0.027 0.127 -0.040 0.060 -0.466 -0.146 -0.010 1.00 
 





Table 2. Main Results of Hypotheses Testing 
                           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm age                   10.512 9.953 9.613 9.601 9.626 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size                  -9.920 -9.649 -9.403 -9.439 -9.406 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State ownership percent    0.463 0.279 0.355 0.363 0.377 
                           (0.398) (0.606) (0.506) (0.496) (0.480) 
Past performance           -0.554 0.218 -0.126 -0.084 -0.097 
                           (0.499) (0.788) (0.875) (0.916) (0.903) 
R&D intensity              0.508 0.923 0.769 1.254 1.142 
                           (0.785) (0.614) (0.669) (0.486) (0.526) 
Subsidiary age             -7.105 -6.714 -6.459 -6.479 -6.510 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidiary size            0.176 0.326 0.335 0.348 0.338 
                           (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Demographic distance       2.164 3.527 3.947 4.692 4.554 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Culture distance           -0.285 0.162 0.323 0.283 0.389 
                           (0.635) (0.786) (0.586) (0.632) (0.512) 
Geographic distance        0.028 -1.283 -1.669 -2.265 -2.209 
                           (0.963) (0.033) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic distance          0.887 0.389 0.042 -0.082 -0.115 
                           (0.004) (0.197) (0.889) (0.784) (0.702) 
OECD  0.465 0.878 0.453 0.657 0.593 
                           (0.435) (0.139) (0.440) (0.264) (0.313) 
Financial crisis -0.000 -0.000 -1.661 -1.516 -1.597 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.053) (0.077) (0.063) 
Correction for self-selection (λ) -34.325 13.724 13.289 10.124 10.662 
                           (0.000) (0.111) (0.119) (0.236) (0.212) 
Institutional distance     -0.122 -0.247 -0.086 -0.553 -0.452 
                           (0.039) (0.000) (0.277) (0.000) (0.000) 
MS                          3.207 2.455 2.314 2.210 
                            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
KS                          5.601 5.193 4.662 4.880 
                            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MS * Institutional distance    -0.198  -0.224 
                             (0.063)  (0.035) 
KS * Institutional distance     0.759 0.781 
                              (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant                   98.086 91.419 91.796 92.205 92.178 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log-likelihood              -4.10e04 -4.05e04 -4.00e04 -4.00e04 -4.00e04 
AIC                        82085.721 81040.560 80066.318 80052.413 80049.961 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 





Table 3. Results of Robustness Analyses: WOS 
                           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm age                   0.992 1.024 1.098 1.094 1.106 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size                  -1.142 -1.046 -1.030 -1.039 -1.035 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State ownership percent    0.255 0.190 0.211 0.211 0.217 
                           (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Past performance           0.484 0.421 0.402 0.398 0.406 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D intensity              0.187 0.250 0.141 0.211 0.160 
                           (0.507) (0.380) (0.622) (0.462) (0.575) 
Subsidiary age             -1.020 -1.022 -1.087 -1.083 -1.099 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidiary size            0.046 0.066 0.062 0.064 0.062 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Demographic distance       0.122 0.306 0.257 0.340 0.309 
                           (0.083) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Culture distance           -0.241 -0.271 -0.194 -0.229 -0.187 
                           (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.004) (0.019) 
Geographic distance        0.330 0.166 0.173 0.125 0.127 
                           (0.000) (0.033) (0.029) (0.121) (0.117) 
Economic distance          0.226 0.190 0.146 0.152 0.131 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
OECD  -0.029 0.019 -0.021 0.003 -0.013 
                           (0.700) (0.797) (0.782) (0.972) (0.864) 
Financial crisis -0.371 -0.310 -0.356 -0.328 -0.356 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Correction for self-selection (λ) -2.836 1.739 1.734 1.439 1.612 
                           (0.001) (0.114) (0.115) (0.195) (0.146) 
Institutional distance     -0.025 -0.042 -0.014 -0.062 -0.040 
                           (0.001) (0.000) (0.198) (0.000) (0.005) 
MS                          0.343 0.292 0.287 0.272 
                            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
KS                          0.628 0.716 0.638 0.702 
                            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MS * Institutional distance    -0.061  -0.070 
                             (0.000)  (0.000) 
KS * Institutional distance     0.045 0.069 
                              (0.067) (0.005) 
Constant                   2.273 1.640 1.764 1.799 1.805 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log-likelihood              -5159.244 -5028.809 -4939.280 -4946.170 -4935.368 
AIC                        10380.488 10123.617 9946.561 9960.340 9940.737 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 





Table 4. Results of Robustness Analyses: Majority-owned 
                           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm age                   2.023 1.956 1.786 2.068 2.066 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size                  -2.219 -2.200 -2.455 -2.615 -2.617 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State ownership percent    0.506 0.512 0.489 0.497 0.495 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Past performance           -0.310 -0.362 -0.278 -0.283 -0.273 
                           (0.088) (0.057) (0.172) (0.189) (0.207) 
R&D intensity              -0.425 0.004 -0.409 -0.498 -0.510 
                           (0.491) (0.995) (0.575) (0.517) (0.505) 
Subsidiary age             -1.318 -1.176 -0.958 -0.931 -0.928 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidiary size            0.084 0.144 0.153 0.171 0.169 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Demographic distance       1.120 1.385 1.960 2.454 2.440 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Culture distance           0.425 0.310 0.208 -0.051 -0.039 
                           (0.005) (0.054) (0.236) (0.785) (0.837) 
Geographic distance        -0.200 -0.552 -1.037 -1.571 -1.576 
                           (0.203) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic distance          -0.324 -0.334 -0.480 -0.527 -0.541 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OECD  -0.212 -0.123 -0.150 0.024 0.022 
                           (0.119) (0.390) (0.317) (0.873) (0.883) 
Financial crisis 0.028 0.015 -0.092 0.057 0.053 
 (0.904) (0.951) (0.721) (0.833) (0.846) 
Correction for self-selection (λ) -7.661 1.365 0.017 -3.486 -3.216 
                           (0.000) (0.532) (0.993) (0.107) (0.138) 
Institutional distance     -0.207 -0.244 -0.180 -0.366 -0.351 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MS                          0.594 0.438 0.090 0.132 
                            (0.000) (0.000) (0.519) (0.354) 
KS                          1.390 1.273 1.396 1.423 
                            (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MS * Institutional distance    -0.083  -0.083 
                             (0.034)  (0.136) 
KS * Institutional distance     0.217 0.292 
                              (0.008) (0.003) 
Constant                   5.569 4.231 4.204 4.558 4.525 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log-likelihood              -1746.242 -1614.811 -1459.639 -1326.829 -1325.704 
AIC                        3550.483 3291.623 2983.279 2717.658 2717.408 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 




Table 5. Results of Robustness Analyses: Separating Markets 
                           (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Less developed countries Developed countries 
Firm age                   15.970 16.041 7.378 6.999 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size                  -8.847 -8.905 -8.532 -8.154 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State ownership percent    -1.688 -1.605 2.014 1.876 
                           (0.115) (0.133) (0.001) (0.002) 
Past performance           -2.705 -3.209 0.505 -0.195 
                           (0.069) (0.031) (0.584) (0.831) 
R&D intensity              5.500 4.736 -0.500 -1.303 
                           (0.231) (0.301) (0.787) (0.476) 
Subsidiary age             -11.109 -10.878 -5.231 -5.030 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidiary size            0.136 0.133 0.382 0.449 
                           (0.292) (0.307) (0.000) (0.000) 
Demographic distance       5.366 5.076 3.203 3.537 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) 
Culture distance           3.247 3.646 0.257 1.028 
                           (0.008) (0.004) (0.720) (0.152) 
Geographic distance        -5.368 -5.594 5.049 5.120 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic distance          0.765 0.678 -2.503 -2.949 
                           (0.194) (0.251) (0.000) (0.000) 
OECD  3.850 3.796 -9.197 -9.777 
                           (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial crisis 18.087 17.139 4.223 3.974 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.074) 
Institutional distance     -0.315 -0.292 -0.248 -0.550 
                           (0.007) (0.060) (0.001) (0.103) 
MS                         6.688 7.523 -1.747 -1.696 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
KS                         7.027 6.740 2.548 2.222 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.066) 
MS * Institutional distance   -0.447  -0.422 
                            (0.036)  (0.001) 
KS * Institutional distance   0.637  0.011 
                            (0.158)  (0.980) 
Constant                   80.769 81.137 96.054 96.390 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included 
Log-likelihood              -1.49e04 -1.47e04 -2.54e04 -2.52e04 
AIC                        29762.568 29489.886 50950.681 50376.973 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 




Table 6. Results of Robustness Analyses: Innovation Distance 
                           (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm age                   11.104 10.680 10.739 10.703 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size                  -9.839 -9.855 -10.293 -10.162 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State ownership percent    0.529 0.580 0.832 0.771 
                           (0.333) (0.284) (0.125) (0.154) 
Past performance           -0.152 0.219 0.151 0.247 
                           (0.852) (0.787) (0.853) (0.761) 
R&D intensity              1.181 1.252 0.709 1.027 
                           (0.523) (0.493) (0.698) (0.574) 
Subsidiary age             -7.237 -7.171 -7.078 -7.140 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidiary size            0.250 0.253 0.273 0.269 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Demographic distance       8.901 8.113 10.014 9.281 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Culture distance           -1.569 -1.664 -2.298 -2.094 
                           (0.010) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) 
Geographic distance        5.650 6.070 6.488 6.419 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic distance          1.004 1.048 0.830 0.906 
                           (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) 
OECD  -2.458 -3.294 -4.075 -3.857 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial crisis -0.000 -1.543 -1.357 -1.477 
 (0.100) (0.076) (0.121) (0.091) 
Correction for self-selection (λ) 25.665 20.693 16.284 16.965 
                           (0.003) (0.017) (0.066) (0.055) 
Innovation distance     -4.387 -1.110 -7.793 -5.181 
                           (0.000) (0.105) (0.000) (0.000) 
MS                         4.111 2.795 3.354 3.123 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
KS                         6.931 6.819 8.358 7.904 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MS * Innovation distance   -3.784  -2.295 
                            (0.000)  (0.000) 
KS * Innovation distance    5.904 4.411 
                             (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant                   92.998 93.270 92.494 92.772 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included 
Log-likelihood              -4.06e04 -4.01e04 -3.98e04 -3.98e04 
AIC                        81212.642 80335.846 79688.793 79673.818 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 





Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variables Measures 
Dependent Variable  
Equity Ownership Ownership of equity holding in a firm’s foreign subsidiary (in percentage). 
WOS Coded as 1 if a Chinese MNE has 100% of foreign subsidiary equity ownership and 0 if 
the percentage of the foreign subsidiary equity is less than 100%. 
Majority-owned Coded as 1 if a Chinese MNE has more than 50% of foreign subsidiary equity 
ownership and 0 if the percentage is below 50%. 
Independent Variable  
MS Coded as 1 if a subsidiary indicates that FDI was one of the motives to increase sales in 
new foreign markets (i.e., market-seeking motive) and 0 otherwise. 
KS Coded as 1 if a subsidiary indicates its FDI was one the key motive to access advanced 
technologies in a host market (i.e., knowledge-seeking motive) and 0 otherwise. 
Moderators  
Institutional Distance Mahalanobis-based measure of cross-national political distance developed by Berry and 
colleagues (2010), which consists of five indicators: political stability, democracy 
scores, size of the state sector relative to that of the total economy, World Trade 
Organization (WTO) membership, and regional trade agreement. 
Innovation Distance Difference in the number of patents and scientific articles per capita between two 
countries. 
Controls  
Firm Age The number of years since the parent firm established. 
Firm Size The logarithm of parent firm’s annual sales in Chinese yuan. 
State Ownership Percent Ownership of equity holding owned by Chinese government. 
Past Performance Return on Assets of parent firm. 
R&D Intensity R&D expenditures divided by total sales of parent firm. 
Subsidiary Age The number of years elapsed since the subsidiary firm’s establishment. 
Subsidiary Size The logarithm of the real capital of the subsidiary invested in a foreign market. 
Demographic Distance Mahalanobis-based measure of cross-national demographic distance developed by Berry 
and colleagues (2010), which consists of four components: life expectancy at birth (total 
years), birth rate, crude (per 1000 people), population ages 0-14 (% of total), population 
ages 65 and above (% of total). 
Culture Distance Mahalanobis-based measure of cross-national cultural distance developed by Berry and 
colleagues (2010), which consists of four components: obedience and respect for 
authority, trusting people and job security, independence and the role of government in 
providing for its citizens, the importance of family and work. 
Geographic Distance The great circle distance between two countries according to the coordinates of the 
geographic center of the countries. 
Economic Distance Mahalanobis-based measure of cross-national economic distance developed by Berry 
and colleagues (2010), which consists of four components: GDP per capita (2000 US$), 
GDP deflator (% GDP), exports of goods and services (% GDP), and imports of goods 
and services (% GDP). 
OECD Coded as 1 if the foreign market belongs to the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and 0 otherwise. 






Appendix B. The Results of Robustness Analyses: WGI Institutional Distance 
                           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm age                   2.478 2.374 2.337 2.379 2.341 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size                  -2.124 -1.838 -1.847 -1.835 -1.844 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State ownership percent    0.010 0.043 0.039 0.041 0.035 
                           (0.947) (0.776) (0.798) (0.787) (0.815) 
Past performance           -0.184 -0.334 -0.384 -0.312 -0.354 
                           (0.380) (0.110) (0.066) (0.136) (0.090) 
R&D intensity              -0.144 0.014 -0.078 0.061 -0.015 
                           (0.750) (0.975) (0.861) (0.892) (0.974) 
Subsidiary age             -1.561 -1.507 -1.488 -1.516 -1.501 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsidiary size            0.027 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.013 
                           (0.109) (0.307) (0.376) (0.333) (0.425) 
Demographic distance       0.803 0.804 0.867 0.774 0.827 
                           (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) 
Culture distance           -0.137 -0.027 -0.042 -0.019 -0.030 
                           (0.412) (0.870) (0.802) (0.910) (0.856) 
Geographic distance        0.611 0.644 0.859 0.624 0.844 
                           (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Economic distance          0.331 0.325 0.377 0.323 0.376 
                           (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OECD  -0.254 -0.307 -0.436 -0.292 -0.422 
                           (0.164) (0.090) (0.017) (0.107) (0.021) 
Financial crisis 1.829 1.864 1.825 1.883 1.851 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Correction for self-selection (λ) 0.541 0.660 0.718 0.682 0.755 
                           (0.057) (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.007) 
WGI Institutional distance     -0.440 -0.350 -0.440 -0.334 -0.423 
                           (0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.033) (0.007) 
MS                         
 
1.064 1.056 1.047 1.031 
                           
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
KS                         
 
0.939 0.908 0.943 0.911 
                           
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 










KS * WGI Institutional distance  
   
0.391 0.574 
                           
   
(0.069) (0.008) 
Constant                   3.117 2.252 2.389 2.260 2.410 
                           (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Log-likelihood              -14609.69 -14565.36 -14548.59 -14563.68 -14545.02 
AIC                        29353.38 29268.72 29237.17 29267.37 29232.04 
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
N=9,305. P-values are in parentheses. 
